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Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

, Volume 54, Issue 3, pp 359–371 | Cite as

The Myerson value for union stable structures

  • E. Algaba
  • J. M. Bilbao
  • P. Borm
  • J. J. López
Article

Abstract

We study cooperation structures with the following property: Given any two feasible coalitions with non-empty intersection, its union is a feasible coalition again. These combinatorial structures have a direct relationship with graph communication situations and conference structures à la Myerson. Characterizations of the Myerson value in this context are provided using the concept of basis for union stable systems. Moreover, TU-games restricted by union stable systems generalizes graph-restricted games and games with permission structures.

Mathematics Subject Classification 2000: 91A12 
Key words: Myerson value communication situations permission structures union stable systems Shapley value 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • E. Algaba
    • 1
  • J. M. Bilbao
    • 1
  • P. Borm
    • 2
  • J. J. López
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Seville, Escuela Superior de Ingenieros, Camino de los Descubrimientos s/n, 41092 Sevilla, Spain (E-mail: mbilbao@cica.es)ES
  2. 2.Tilburg University, Department of Econometrics and CentER, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands (E-mail: P.E.M.Borm@kub.nl)NL

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