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Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games

  • T. S. H. Driessen
  • D. Paulusma
  • 61 Downloads

Abstract.

Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive form. In the latter setting, the Shapley value for quasi-concave games is shown to be a core-allocation.

Key words: cooperative game poset probability distribution Shapley value 
1991 Mathematics Subject Classifications: 90D12 90D40. 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • T. S. H. Driessen
    • 1
  • D. Paulusma
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of Mathematical Sciences, University of Twente, P.O.Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands (E-mail: {driessen,paulusma}@math.utwente.nl)NL

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