A bankruptcy approach to the core cover
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In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitionally stable allocations captured by an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity of the core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game.
KeywordsCooperative game theory Compromise admissible games Bankruptcy Core cover Complexity
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