Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

, Volume 75, Issue 1, pp 67–82 | Cite as

A private contributions game for joint replenishment

Original Article

Abstract

We study a non-cooperative game for joint replenishment by n firms that operate under an EOQ-like setting. Each firm decides whether to replenish independently or to participate in joint replenishment, and how much to contribute to joint ordering costs in case of participation. Joint replenishment cycle time is set by an intermediary as the lowest cycle time that can be financed with the private contributions of participating firms. We characterize the behavior and outcomes under undominated Nash equilibria.

Keywords

Joint replenishment Economic order quantity Non-cooperative games Private contributions 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Aksoy Y, Erengüç S (1988) Multi-item models with coordinated replenishments: a survey. Int J Prod Manag 8: 63–73uml;CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Anily S, Haviv M (2007) The cost allocation problem for the first order interaction joint replenishment model. Oper Res 55: 292–302CrossRefMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  3. Bauso D, Giarre L, Presenti R (2008) Consensus in noncooperative dynamic games: a multiretailer inventory application. IEEE Trans Autom Control 53: 998–1003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Bergstrom T, Blume L, Varian H (1986) On the private provision of public goods. J Public Econ 29: 25–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Cachon GP, Netessine S (2004) Game theory in supply chain analysis. In: Simchi-Levi D, Wu SD, Shen ZM (eds) Handbook of quantitative supply chain analysis: modeling in the E-business era. Kluwer, Boston, pp 13–66Google Scholar
  6. Chinchuluun A, Karakitsiou A, Mavrommati A (2008) Game theory models and their applications in inventory management and supply chain. In: Chinchuluun A, Pardalos PM, Migdalas A, Pitsoulis L (eds) Pareto optimality, game theory and equilibria. Springer, New York, pp 833–865CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Dror M, Hartman BC (2011) Survey of cooperative inventory games and extensions. J Oper Res Soc 62: 565–580CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Fiestras-Janeiro MG, Garcia-Jurado I, Meca A, Mosquera MA (2011) Cooperative game theory and inventory management. Eur J Oper Res 210: 459–466CrossRefMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  9. Harris FW (1913) How many parts to make at once. Fact Mag Manag 10:135-136, 152Google Scholar
  10. Hartman BC, Dror M (2007) Shipment consolidation: who pays for it and how much?.  Manag Sci 53: 78–87Google Scholar
  11. Jans R, Degraeve Z (2008) Modeling industrial lot sizing problems: a review. Int J Prod Res 46: 1619–1643CrossRefMATHGoogle Scholar
  12. Khouja M, Goyal S (2008) A review of the joint replenishment problem literature: 1989-2005. Eur J Oper Res 86: 1–16CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  13. Körpeoğlu E, Şen A, Güler K (2010) A competitive game for joint replenishment with information asymmetry, Department of Industrial Engineering. Bilkent University, Ankara, TurkeyGoogle Scholar
  14. Leng M, Parlar M (2005) Game theoretic applications in supply chain management: a review. INFOR 43: 187–220MathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  15. Meca A, Garcia-Jurado I, Borm P (2003) Cooperation and competition in inventory games. Math Methods Oper Res 57: 481–493MATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  16. Meca A, Timmer J, Garcia-Jurado I, Borm P (2004) Inventory games. Eur J Oper Res 156: 127–139CrossRefMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  17. Minner S (2007) Bargaining for cooperative economic ordering. Decis Support Syst 43: 569–583CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Zipkin PH (2000) Foundations of inventory management. McGraw-Hill Higher Education, New YorkGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Industrial EngineeringBilkent UniversityBilkentTurkey
  2. 2.Hewlett-Packard LaboratoriesPalo AltoUSA

Personalised recommendations