Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

, Volume 66, Issue 2, pp 255–261

Owen coalitional value without additivity axiom

Original Article


We show that the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure can be characterized without the additivity axiom similarly as it was done by Young for the Shapley value for general TU games. Our axiomatization via four axioms of efficiency, marginality, symmetry across coalitions, and symmetry within coalitions is obtained from the original Owen’s one by the replacement of additivity and null-player via marginality. We show that the alike axiomatization for the generalization of the Owen value suggested by Winter for games with level structure is valid as well.


Cooperative TU game Coalitional structure Owen value Axiomatic characterization Marginality 


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.SPb Institute for Economics and Mathematics Russian Academy of SciencesSt.PetersburgRussia

Personalised recommendations