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Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

, Volume 64, Issue 1, pp 95–106 | Cite as

The Compromise Value for Cooperative Games with Random Payoffs

  • Judith TimmerEmail author
Original Article

Abstract

This paper introduces and studies the compromise value for cooperative games with random payoffs, that is, for cooperative games where the payoff to a coalition of players is a random variable. This value is a compromise between utopia payoffs and minimal rights and its definition is based on the compromise value for NTU games and the τ-value for TU games. It is shown that the nonempty core of a cooperative game with random payoffs is bounded by the utopia payoffs and the minimal rights. Consequently, for such games the compromise value exists. Further, we show that the compromise value of a cooperative game with random payoffs coincides with the τ-value of a related TU game if the players have a certain type of preferences. Finally, the compromise value and the marginal value, which is defined as the average of the marginal vectors, coincide on the class of two-person games. This results in a characterization of the compromise value for two-person games.

Keywords

Compromise value Random payoffs Cooperative games 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center and the Department of Econometrics and ORTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands

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