International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 33, Issue 1, pp 1–19 | Cite as

Network formation and anti-coordination games

  • Yann Bramoullé
  • Dunia López-PintadoEmail author
  • Sanjeev Goyal
  • Fernando Vega-Redondo


We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior in 2×2 anti-coordination games – games where a player’s best response is to choose an action unlike that of her partner. We characterize the equilibrium networks as well as study the effects of network structure on individual behavior. Our analysis shows that both network architecture and induced behavior crucially depend on the value of the cost of forming links. In general, equilibrium configurations are found to be neither unique nor efficient.


networks links anti-coordination games efficiency 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yann Bramoullé
    • 1
  • Dunia López-Pintado
    • 2
    Email author
  • Sanjeev Goyal
    • 3
    • 5
  • Fernando Vega-Redondo
    • 4
  1. 1.LEERNAUniversity of ToulouseToulouseFrance
  2. 2.Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis EconómicoUniversidad de AlicanteAlicanteSpain
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsUniversity of EssexColchesterU.K
  4. 4.Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones EconómicasUniversidad de AlicanteAlicante
  5. 5.Tinbergen InstituteRotterdamNetherlands

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