International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 32, Issue 4, pp 545–560 | Cite as

Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

  • Lars EhlersEmail author
  • Bettina Klaus


We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”

JEL classification

 D63 D70 

Key words

Indivisible objects Resource-monotonicity 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Département de SciencesÉconomiques and CIREQ, Université de MontréalQuébecCanada
  2. 2.Departament d’Economia i d’Historia EconomicaUniversitat Autonoma de BarcelonaBellaterra (Barcelona)Spain

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