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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 32, Issue 2, pp 273–293 | Cite as

Hide and seek in Arizona

  • Robert W. Rosenthal
  • Jason Shachat
  • Mark Walker
Article

Abstract

Laboratory subjects repeatedly played one of two variations of a simple two-person zero-sum game of “hide and seek”. Three puzzling departures from the prescriptions of equilibrium theory are found in the data: an asymmetry related to the player’s role in the game; an asymmetry across the game variations; and positive serial correlation in subjects’ play. Possible explanations for these departures are considered.

Key words:

Mixed strategy Minimax Experiment 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert W. Rosenthal
    • 1
  • Jason Shachat
    • 2
  • Mark Walker
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsBoston University
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsNational University of SingaporeSingapore
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsUniversity of ArizonaTucson

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