International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 32, Issue 2, pp 223–227 | Cite as

Shapley value for constant-sum games

  • Anna B. KhmelnitskayaEmail author


It is proved that Young’s [4] axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and symmetry is still valid for the Shapley value defined on the class of nonnegative constant-sum games with nonzero worth of grand coalition and on the entire class of constant-sum games as well.

Key words:

 cooperative TU game value axiomatic characterization Shapley value 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.SPb Institute for Economics and Mathematics Russian Academy of SciencesSt.PetersburgRussia

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