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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 31, Issue 2, pp 269–283 | Cite as

A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers

  • Marilda Sotomayor

Abstract.

A labor market where firms and workers are heterogeneous and may form more than one partnership is considered. A natural concept of core for such markets, different from the concept used by Thompson (1977), is defined. We show that the core is non-empty and is, in general, strictly greater than Thompson's core. Unlike Thompson, we found several dissimilarities between our model and the well known one-to-one case studied in Shapley and Shubik (1972).

JEL numbers: C78, D78 
Key words: stable payoff, core, optimal stable payoffs. 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marilda Sotomayor
    • 1
  1. 1.Universidade de São Paulo; Departamento de Economia Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto, 908; Cidade Universitária 05508-900 São Paulo, SP, Brazil (e-mail: marildas@usp.br)BR

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