International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 30, Issue 4, pp 527–538 | Cite as

Best response dynamics for role games

  • Ulrich Berger


In a role game, players can condition their strategies on their player position in the base game. If the base game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game, the set of Nash equilibria of the role game is globally asymptotically stable under the best response dynamics. If the base game is 2 ×2, then in the cyclic case the set of role game equilibria is a continuum. We identify a single equilibrium in this continuum that attracts all best response paths outside the continuum.

Key words: Role Games Best Response Dynamics Learning Evolution. 
JEL classification: C72 D83. 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ulrich Berger
    • 1
  1. 1.Vienna University of Economics, Department VW5, Augasse 2-6, A-1090 Vienna, Austria (e-mail:

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