Advertisement

International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 29, Issue 4, pp 495–515 | Cite as

When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis

  • Kenneth Clark
  • Stephen Kay
  • Martin Sefton

Abstract.

We investigate the effect of non-binding pre-play communication in experiments with simple two-player coordination games. We reproduce the results of other studies in which play converges to a Pareto-dominated equilibrium in the absence of communication, and communication moves outcomes in the direction of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. However, we provide new results which show that the effectiveness of communication is sensitive to the structure of payoffs. Our results support an argument put forward by Aumann: agreements to play a Nash equilibrium are fragile when players have a strict preference over their opponent's strategy choice. We also find that informative communication does not necessarily lead to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Experimental Analysis Strategy Choice Coordination Game Informative Communication 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kenneth Clark
    • 1
  • Stephen Kay
    • 1
  • Martin Sefton
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Economic Studies, Faculty of Economic and Social Studies, Dover Street, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL.XX

Personalised recommendations