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Labelling, homophily and preference evolution

  • Jiabin WuEmail author
Original Paper
  • 13 Downloads

Abstract

We consider a population of agents whose preference types are unobservable but imperfectly correlated with certain observable labels such as customs, languages, and origins. In addition, the matching process exhibits homophily: agents tend to interact with those who share the same labels. We show that labelling and homophily interact in a non-trivial way to influence the evolution of preferences, which cannot be accounted for in the extant literature.

Keywords

Homophily Labelling Assortative matching Preference evolution Evolutionary game theory 

JEL Classifications

C73 D80 

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of OregonEugeneUSA

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