Rationalizability in multicriteria games

  • Yasuo Sasaki
Original Paper


We define rationalizability for multicriteria games and examine its properties. In a multicriteria game, each agent can have multiple decision criteria and thus has a vector-valued utility function. An agent’s rationalizable action is defined as such an action that can survive iterated elimination of never-Pareto optimal actions. We first generalize some properties of standard rationalizability such as existence to the multicriteria case. We then show that a rationalizable action in some weighted game is also rationalizable in the original multicriteria game, whereas the converse may not hold. This implies the robustness of non-rationalizable actions under utility aggregations for any weight vectors. We also discuss interpretations of mixed actions and their implications to multicriteria games.


Multicriteria game Rationalizability Pareto optimality 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Knowledge ScienceJapan Advanced Institute of Science and TechnologyNomiJapan

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