We consider a final-offer arbitration problem between two players with two quantitative issues in dispute. Under reasonable assumptions we model the problem as a zero-sum two person game and show that a pair of pure strategies explicitly constructed are the unique minimax strategies for the two players.
Final-offer arbitration Non-cooperative game theory Multi-issue Brams–Merrill
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My sincere thanks to T. E. S. Raghavan for first suggesting this problem, for his keen interest, encouragement, guidance and for many hours of discussion and review. Thanks also to Marc Kilgour for valuable feedback.
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