International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 48, Issue 1, pp 157–179 | Cite as

The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs

  • Paula Jaramillo
  • Çaǧatay Kayı
  • Flip KlijnEmail author
Original Paper


This paper deals with roommate problems (Gale and Shapley, Am Math Mon 69(1):9–15, 1962) that are solvable, i.e., have a non-empty core (set of stable matchings). We study rank-fairness within pairs of stable matchings and the size of the core by means of maximal and average rank gaps. We provide upper bounds in terms of maximal and average disagreements in the agents’ rankings. Finally, we show that most of our bounds are tight.


Matching Roommate problem Stability Core Rank-fairness Rank gap Bound 

JEL Classification



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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universidad de Los AndesBogotáColombia
  2. 2.Universidad del RosarioBogotáColombia
  3. 3.Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and Barcelona GSEBarcelonaSpain

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