International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 46, Issue 2, pp 583–589 | Cite as

The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity

  • Jonathan NewtonEmail author


Differing degrees of assortativity in matching can be expected to have both genetic and cultural determinants. When assortativity is subject to evolution, the main result of Alger and Weibull (Econometrica 81:2269–2302 2013) on the evolution of stable other-regarding preferences does not hold. Instead, both non-Nash and Pareto inefficient behavior are evolutionarily unstable.


Evolution Moral values Assortative matching 

JEL Classification



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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of EconomicsUniversity of SydneyNew South WalesAustralia

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