The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity
Differing degrees of assortativity in matching can be expected to have both genetic and cultural determinants. When assortativity is subject to evolution, the main result of Alger and Weibull (Econometrica 81:2269–2302 2013) on the evolution of stable other-regarding preferences does not hold. Instead, both non-Nash and Pareto inefficient behavior are evolutionarily unstable.
KeywordsEvolution Moral values Assortative matching
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