International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 46, Issue 2, pp 457–473

Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality

Original Paper


Characterizations of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and rationalizability in terms of common knowledge of rationality are well known. Analogous characterizations of sequential equilibrium, (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium, and quasi-perfect equilibrium in n-player games are obtained here, using earlier results of Halpern characterizing these solution concepts using non-Archimedean fields.


Characterizing solution concepts Common knowledge of rationality Sequential equilibrium Perfect equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Computer Science DepartmentCornell UniversityIthacaUSA
  2. 2.Department of Electrical EngineeringTechnion-Israel Institute of TechnologyHaifaIsrael

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