Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality
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Characterizations of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and rationalizability in terms of common knowledge of rationality are well known. Analogous characterizations of sequential equilibrium, (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium, and quasi-perfect equilibrium in n-player games are obtained here, using earlier results of Halpern characterizing these solution concepts using non-Archimedean fields.
KeywordsCharacterizing solution concepts Common knowledge of rationality Sequential equilibrium Perfect equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their detailed reading of the paper and useful comments that helped improve the paper. In particular, we thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to compare our results to those of Asheim and Perea (2005).
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