International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 46, Issue 2, pp 311–326 | Cite as

Characterizations of perfect recall

Original Paper

Abstract

This paper considers the condition of perfect recall for the class of arbitrarily large discrete extensive form games. The known definitions of perfect recall are shown to be equivalent even beyond finite games. Further, a qualitatively new characterization in terms of choices is obtained. In particular, an extensive form game satisfies perfect recall if and only if the set of choices, viewed as sets of ultimate outcomes, fulfill the “Trivial Intersection” property, that is, any two choices with nonempty intersection are ordered by set inclusion.

Keywords

Perfect recall Large extensive form games Non-cooperative games 

JEL Classification

C72 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of CologneCologneGermany
  2. 2.Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, and Vienna Graduate School of FinanceViennaAustria

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