I propose a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to find solutions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities. I show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegotiated. In the ordinal game derived from these payoff configurations, a core stable partition can be found, i.e. a partition in which no group of players has an incentive to jointly change their coalitions.
Games with non-transferable utility in partition function form Bargaining with claims Ordinal games Core stable partitions
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