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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 44, Issue 1, pp 195–207 | Cite as

Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money

  • Miki Kato
  • Shinji OhsetoEmail author
  • Shohei Tamura
Article

Abstract

We consider the problem of allocating a single indivisible good among \(n\) agents when monetary transfers are allowed. We study the possibility of constructing strategy-proof, symmetric, and budget balanced mechanisms. We show that there is no strategy-proof, symmetric, and budget balanced mechanism (under the weak domain condition that the set of agent’s possible valuations includes at least \(n+1\) common valuations). Moreover, this result implies that there is no strategy-proof, symmetric, and budget balanced mechanism (i) in the model where agents may have non-quasilinear preferences, and/or (ii) in the unit-demand model with \(n\) heterogeneous indivisible goods.

Keywords

Strategy-proofness Symmetry Budget balance Indivisible good Monetary transfer 

JEL Classification

C72 D63 D71 D82 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Kazutoshi Ando, an associate editor, and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions and comments. This research was partially supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tohoku Seikatsu Bunka CollegeSendaiJapan
  2. 2.Faculty of EconomicsTohoku UniversitySendaiJapan

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