# On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria

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## Abstract

We prove the generic equivalence between quasi-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. Combining this result with Blume and Zame (Econometrica 62:783–794, 1994) shows that perfect, quasi-perfect and sequential equilibrium coincide in generic games.

## Keywords

Backwards induction Perfect equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Lower-hemicontinuity Upper-hemicontinuity## JEL Classification

C72## Notes

### Acknowledgments

We thank Priscila Man, the associate editor and two anonymous reviewers for thoughtful comments that improved the presentation and content of the paper. Carlos thanks financial support from *UNSW ASBRG* 2010. Jianfei thanks financial support from Shandong University grants IFYT12071 and 2013HW006. The usual disclaimer applies.

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