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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 42, Issue 2, pp 339–355 | Cite as

On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game

  • Yan-An Hwang
Article
  • 262 Downloads

Abstract

This paper presents two characterizations of the core on the domain of all NTU games. One is based on consistency with respect to “complement-reduced game” and converse consistency with respect to “max-reduced game”. The other is based on consistency with respect to “max-reduced game” and weak converse consistency with respect to “complement-reduced game”. Besides, we introduce an alternative definition of individual rationality, we name conditional individual rationality, which is compatible with non-emptiness. We discuss axiomatic characterizations involving conditional individual rationality for the core.

Keywords

Core Reduced game Consistency Converse consistency  Conditional individual rationality 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The author is very grateful to the AE and anonymous referees for valuable comments which much improved the paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Applied MathematicsNational Dong Hwa UniversityHualienTaiwan

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