Collusion, quarrel, and the Banzhaf value
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We provide new, concise characterizations of the Banzhaf value on a fixed player set employing just the standard dummy player property and one of the collusion properties suggested by Haller (Int J Game Theory 23:261–281, 1994) and Malawski (Int J Game Theory 31:47–67, 2002). Within these characterizations, any of the collusion properties can be replaced by additivity and the quarrel property due to the latter author.
KeywordsBanzhaf value Symmetry Collusion Proxy Association Distrust Quarrel
We are indebted to Frank Huettner for helpful discussions on the matter.
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