Axiomatizing core extensions
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We give an axiomatization of the aspiration core on the domain of all TU-games using a relaxed feasibility condition, non-emptiness, individual rationality, and generalized versions of the reduced game property (consistency) and superadditivity. Our axioms also characterize the C-core (Guesnerie and Oddou, Econ Lett 3(4):301–306, 1979; Sun et al. J Math Econ 44(7–8):853–860, 2008) and the core on appropriate subdomains. The main result of the paper generalizes Peleg’s (J Math Econ 14(2):203–214, 1985) core axiomatization to the entire family of TU-games.
KeywordsCore extensions Axiomatization Aspiration core C-core Consistency
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