Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality
- 356 Downloads
We consider a repeated congestion game with imperfect monitoring. At each stage, each player chooses to use some facilities and pays a cost that increases with the congestion. Two versions of the model are examined: a public monitoring setting where agents observe the cost of each available facility, and a private monitoring one where players observe only the cost of the facilities they use. A partial folk theorem holds: a Pareto-optimal outcome may result from selfish behavior and be sustained by a belief-free equilibrium of the repeated game. We prove this result assuming that players use strategies of bounded complexity and we estimate the strategic complexity needed to achieve efficiency. It is shown that, under some conditions on the number of players and the structure of the game, this complexity is very small even under private monitoring. The case of network routing games is examined in detail.
KeywordsFolk theorem Braess’s paradox Network routing games Private monitoring Public monitoring Anonymous games Strategic complexity Contagion strategy Calendar strategy
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Afergan M (2005) Applying the repeated game framework to multiparty networked applications. Ph.D. thesis, MIT, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
- Afergan M (2006) Using repeated games to design incentive-based routing systems. In: IEEE INFOCOM 2006. BarcelonaGoogle Scholar
- Afergan M, Sami R (2006) Repeated-game modeling of multicast overlays. In: IEEE INFOCOM 2006. BarcelonaGoogle Scholar
- Aumann RJ, Shapley LS (1976) Long-term competition—a game-theoretic analysis. Technical report, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Reprinted in Essays in Game Theory. In: Megiddo N (ed) Honor of Michael Maschler (1994). Springer, New York, pp 1–15Google Scholar
- Braess D (1968) Úber ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung. Unternehmensforschung 12: 258–268Google Scholar
- Braess D (2005) On a paradox of traffic planning. Transport Sci 39:446–450. Translation of the original German (1968) article by D. Braess, A. Nagurney and T. WakolbingerGoogle Scholar
- Papadimitriou C (2001) Algorithms, games, and the Internet. In: Proceedings of the 33rd annual ACM symposium on the theory of computing, Hersonissos, Crete. ACM, New York, NY, USA, pp 749–753Google Scholar
- Roughgarden T (2005) Selfish routing and the price of anarchy. MIT Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
- Roughgarden T, Tardos É (2007) Introduction to the inefficiency of equilibria. In: Algorithmic game theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 443–459Google Scholar
- Rubinstein A (1977) Equilibrium in supergames. Master’s thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Reprinted in Essays in Game Theory, In honor of Michael Maschler (1994) Edited by Nimrod Megiddo, pp 17–27. Springer, New YorkGoogle Scholar