International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 41, Issue 3, pp 517–552 | Cite as

Essential collections for equilibrium concepts

  • Julio González-DíazEmail author
  • Federica Briata
  • Ignacio García-Jurado
  • Fioravante Patrone


The aim of this study is to identify and characterize the parts of an extensive form game that are “relevant” to determining whether the outcome of a certain strategy profile is an equilibrium outcome. We formally define what we mean by “relevant” and refer to the associated collection of information sets as essential. We apply this idea to a number of classic equilibrium concepts and discuss some implications of our approach.


Extensive games Equilibrium concepts Relevant information sets Essential collections Reduced game Virtual equilibrium 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Julio González-Díaz
    • 1
    Email author
  • Federica Briata
    • 2
  • Ignacio García-Jurado
    • 3
  • Fioravante Patrone
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of Statistics and Operations ResearchUniversity of Santiago de CompostelaSantiago de CompostelaSpain
  2. 2.Science DepartmentUniversity of Chieti and PescaraChieti, PescaraItaly
  3. 3.Department of MathematicsCoruña UniversityCoruñaSpain
  4. 4.DIPTEM, University of GenovaGenovaItaly

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