International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 42, Issue 3, pp 593–611 | Cite as

Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium

Article

Abstract

It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with minimization of strategy complexity, Rubinstein and co-authors studied forms of Nash equilibrium where strategies are maximally simplified in that no strategy can be further simplified without sacrificing payoff. Inspired by this line of work, we introduce a notion of equilibrium whereby strategies are also maximally simplified, but with respect to a simplification procedure that is more careful in that a player will not simplify if the simplification incents other players to deviate. We study such equilibria in two-player machine games in which players choose finite automata that succinctly represent strategies for repeated games; in this context, we present techniques for establishing that an outcome is at equilibrium and present results on the structure of equilibria.

Keywords

Bounded rationality Automata Repeated games Simplification Strategy complexity 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departament de Tecnologies de la Informació i les ComunicacionsUniversitat Pompeu FabraBarcelonaSpain

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