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Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games

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Abstract

We analyze a Colonel Blotto game in which opposing parties have differing relative intensities. In other words, the game is non-zero sum because colonels have asymmetric and heterogeneous battlefield valuations. We characterize the colonels’ payoffs that sustain a pure strategy equilibrium and present an algorithm that reaches the equilibrium actions (when they exist). Finally we show that the set of games with a pure strategy equilibria is non-empty.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. London School of Economics, London, UK

    Rafael Hortala-Vallve

  2. Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany

    Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Authors
  1. Rafael Hortala-Vallve
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  2. Aniol Llorente-Saguer
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Correspondence to Aniol Llorente-Saguer.

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Hortala-Vallve, R., Llorente-Saguer, A. Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games. Int J Game Theory 41, 331–343 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0288-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0288-4

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