International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 41, Issue 1, pp 131–155 | Cite as

Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players

  • Leandro C. RêgoEmail author
  • Joseph Y. Halpern


Most work in game theory assumes that players are perfect reasoners and have common knowledge of all significant aspects of the game. In earlier work (Halpern and Rêgo 2006,, we proposed a framework for representing and analyzing games with possibly unaware players, and suggested a generalization of Nash equilibrium appropriate for games with unaware players that we called generalized Nash equilibrium. Here, we use this framework to analyze other solution concepts that have been considered in the game-theory literature, with a focus on sequential equilibrium.


Economic theory Foundations of game theory Awareness Sequential equilibrium 

JEL Classification

C70 C72 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Statistics DepartmentFederal University of PernambucoRecifeBrazil
  2. 2.Computer Science DepartmentCornell UniversityIthacaUSA

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