International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 39, Issue 4, pp 603–615

Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game

Original Paper

Abstract

We examine the coalition-proof equilibria of a participation game in the provision of a (pure) public good. We study which Nash equilibria are achieved through cooperation, and we investigate coalition-proof equilibria under strict and weak domination. We show that under some incentive condition, (i) a profile of strategies is a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium that is not strictly Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium and (ii) every strict Nash equilibrium for non-participants is a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination.

Keywords

Participation game Coalition-proof equilibrium Dominance relation 

JEL Classification

C72 D62 D71 H41 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of EconomicsShinshu UniversityNaganoJapan

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