International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 40, Issue 1, pp 43–62 | Cite as

Progressive and merging-proof taxation

Article

Abstract

We investigate the implications and logical relations between progressivity (a principle of distributive justice) and merging-proofness (a strategic principle) in taxation. By means of two characterization results, we show that these two principles are intimately related, despite their different nature. In particular, we show that, in the presence of continuity and consistency (a widely accepted framework for taxation) progressivity implies merging-proofness and that the converse implication holds if we add an additional strategic principle extending the scope of merging-proofness to a multilateral setting. By considering operators on the space of taxation rules, we also show that progressivity is slightly more robust than merging-proofness.

Keywords

Taxation Progressivity Merging-proofness Consistency Operators 

JEL Classification

C70 D63 D70 H20 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsKorea UniversitySeoulKorea
  2. 2.Universidad de MálagaMalagaSpain
  3. 3.Universidad Pablo de OlavideSevilleSpain
  4. 4.CORE, Université catholique de LouvainLouvain-la-NeuveBelgium

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