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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 39, Issue 4, pp 657–667 | Cite as

Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion

  • Nitsan Perach
  • Uriel G. RothblumEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

A case study of matching students with dormitory-groups at the Technion lead recently to the study of a variant of the stable matching model with a “qualifying criterion” for the inclusion of a student among those getting an assignment. A notion of stability was introduced for the model and a (student-courting) algorithm which finds a matching that satisfied this criterion and has desired properties was described. Here, we show that students cannot benefit from misrepresenting preferences in an extension of the model that allows dormitory-groups to have different preferences over students and allows these preferences to be incomplete.

Keywords

Stable matching Incentive compatibility Dormitory assignment 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Industrial Engineering and ManagementTechnionHaifaIsrael

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