Free mobility and taste-homogeneity of jurisdiction structures
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We consider a population of agents distributed on the unit interval. Agents form jurisdictions in order to provide a public facility and share its costs equally. This creates an incentive to form large entities. Individuals also incur a transportation cost depending on their location and that of the facility which makes small jurisdictions advantageous. We consider a fairly general class of distributions of agents and generalize previous versions of this model by allowing for non-linear transportation costs. We show that, in general, jurisdictions are not necessarily homogeneous. However, they are if facilities are always intraterritory and transportation costs are superadditive. Superadditivity can be weakened to strictly increasing and strictly concave when agents are uniformly distributed.
KeywordsConsecutiveness Stratification Local public goods Coalition formation Country formation
JEL ClassificationC71 (Cooperative Games) D71 (Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations) H73 (Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects)
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