International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 39, Issue 1–2, pp 177–184 | Cite as

Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

  • Inés Macho-Stadler
  • David Pérez-Castrillo
  • David Wettstein
Original Paper

Abstract

In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalities defined in Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339–356, 2007). This is a large family of values that includes several recent proposals. We show that they can be constructed through the sharing of appropriately defined dividends. Furthermore, we show the flexibility of this approach by using it to generate non-symmetric values.

Keywords

Games with externalities Sharing rules Dividends 

JEL Classification

D62 C71 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Inés Macho-Stadler
    • 1
  • David Pérez-Castrillo
    • 1
  • David Wettstein
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Economics and CODEUniversitat Autònoma de BarcelonaBellaterra, BarcelonaSpain
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsBen-Gurion University of the NegevBeer-ShevaIsrael

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