Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities
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In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalities defined in Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339–356, 2007). This is a large family of values that includes several recent proposals. We show that they can be constructed through the sharing of appropriately defined dividends. Furthermore, we show the flexibility of this approach by using it to generate non-symmetric values.
KeywordsGames with externalities Sharing rules Dividends
JEL ClassificationD62 C71
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