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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 39, Issue 4, pp 563–571 | Cite as

Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property

  • Yoshio Kamijo
  • Takumi KongoEmail author
Article

Abstract

This paper presents an axiomatization of the Shapley value. The balanced cycle contributions property is the key axiom in this paper. It requires that, for any order of all the players, the sum of the claims from each player against his predecessor is balanced with the sum of the claims from each player against his successor. This property is satisfied not only by the Shapley value but also by some other values for TU games. Hence, it is a less restrictive requirement than the balanced contributions property introduced by Myerson (International Journal of Game Theory 9, 169–182, 1980).

Keywords

Axiomatization Balanced cycle contributions property Shapley value 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Political Science and EconomicsWaseda UniversityShinjuku-ku, TokyoJapan
  2. 2.Graduate School of EconomicsWaseda UniversityShinjuku-ku, TokyoJapan

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