International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 39, Issue 1–2, pp 71–88 | Cite as

Bargaining among groups: an axiomatic viewpoint

Original Paper

Abstract

We introduce a model of bargaining among groups, and characterize a family of solutions using a Consistency axiom and a few other invariance and monotonicity properties. For each solution in the family, there exists some constant α ≥ 0 such that the “bargaining power” of a group is proportional to cα, where c is the cardinality of the group.

Keywords

Bargaining solution Group bargaining Joint bargaining paradox 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of MathematicsSeoul National UniversitySeoulKorea
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsRice UniversityHoustonUSA

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