Bargaining among groups: an axiomatic viewpoint
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We introduce a model of bargaining among groups, and characterize a family of solutions using a Consistency axiom and a few other invariance and monotonicity properties. For each solution in the family, there exists some constant α ≥ 0 such that the “bargaining power” of a group is proportional to cα, where c is the cardinality of the group.
KeywordsBargaining solution Group bargaining Joint bargaining paradox
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