A characterization of Kruskal sharing rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems
In Tijs et al. (Eur J Oper Res 175:121–134, 2006) a new family of cost allocation rules is introduced in the context of cost spanning tree problems. In this paper we provide the first characterization of this family by means of population monotonicity and a property of additivity.
KeywordsMinimum cost spanning tree problems Kruskal’s algorithm Sharing rules
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