Nearly serial sharing methods
A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in the input profile. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input, not all of them should receive a bigger share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.
KeywordsSurplus sharing Cost sharing Group monotonicity Serial method
JEL ClassificationC71 D63
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