International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 37, Issue 2, pp 155–184 | Cite as

Nearly serial sharing methods

Original Paper

Abstract

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in the input profile. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input, not all of them should receive a bigger share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

Keywords

Surplus sharing Cost sharing Group monotonicity Serial method 

JEL Classification

C71 D63 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Département de Sciences Economiques and CIREQUniversité de MontréalMontrealCanada

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