International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 36, Issue 3–4, pp 393–407 | Cite as

Core-selecting package auctions

Original Paper

Abstract

Auctions that select core allocations with respect to reported values generate competitive levels of sales revenues at equilibrium and limit bidder incentives to use shills. Among core-selecting auctions, the ones that minimize seller revenues also maximize incentives for truthful reporting, produce the Vickrey outcome when that lies in the core and, in contrast to the Vickrey auction, and create no incentive for a seller to exclude qualified bidders. Core-selecting auctions are related to and share properties with stable matching mechanisms.

Keywords

Core Stable matching Marriage problem Auctions Core-selecting auctions Menu auctions Proxy auctions Package bidding Combinatorial bidding Incentives Truncation strategies 

JEL Classification Numbers

D44 C78 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of BusinessUniversity of ConnecticutStorrsUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsStanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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