A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the technion
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This paper reports on a case study of the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion–Israel Institute of Technology. Two criteria are used in considering applicants. The first criterion, determined by personal socio-economic characteristics, is used to make decisions about the privilege of getting on-campus housing. The second criterion is used for the actual assignment of the students who were found eligible for on-campus housing to specific dormitories—here the priority is determined by academic seniority and academic excellence. A modification of the classic stable matching model that allows for an “entrance criterion” is developed and analyzed. In particular, a new concept of quasi-stable outcomes is introduced and an algorithm that produces such an outcome with desirable properties is described. The algorithm was implemented successfully for the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion toward the 2004/2005 academic year.
KeywordsDormitory placement Matchings Stable matchings Deferred acceptance algorithm
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