On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
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For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference profiles into equivalence classes with the property that all profiles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. This partition allows to reduce the amount of information required by centralized stable mechanisms.
KeywordsMatching Stability Substitutable preferences Semilattice
JEL ClassificationC78 D71 D78
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