International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 36, Issue 3–4, pp 497–518 | Cite as

On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles

  • Ruth Martínez
  • Jordi MassóEmail author
  • Alejandro Neme
  • Jorge Oviedo
Original Paper


For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference profiles into equivalence classes with the property that all profiles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. This partition allows to reduce the amount of information required by centralized stable mechanisms.


Matching Stability Substitutable preferences Semilattice 

JEL Classification

C78 D71 D78 


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Copyright information

© Springer Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ruth Martínez
    • 1
  • Jordi Massó
    • 2
  • Alejandro Neme
    • 1
  • Jorge Oviedo
    • 1
  1. 1.Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San LuisUniversidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICETSan LuisArgentina
  2. 2.Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica and CODEUniversitat Autònoma de BarcelonaBellaterra (Barcelona)Spain

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