Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games
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Abstract
A folk theorem which holds for all repeated matching games is established. The folk theorem holds any time the stage game payoffs of any two players are not affinely equivalent. The result is independent of population size and matching rule—including rules that depend on players choices or the history of play.
Keywords
Repeated games Matching games Social norms Folk theoremJEL Classifications
C72 C78 C79Preview
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