The optimistic TU game in minimum cost spanning tree problems
We associate an optimistic TU game with each minimum cost spanning tree problem. We define the worth of a coalition S as the cost of connecting agents in S to the source assuming that agents in N\S are already connected to the source, and agents in S can connect through agents in N\S. We study the Shapley value of this new game.
KeywordsMinimum cost spanning tree problems Optimistic TU game Shapley value
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