International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 36, Issue 2, pp 223–239 | Cite as

The optimistic TU game in minimum cost spanning tree problems

Original Paper

Abstract

We associate an optimistic TU game with each minimum cost spanning tree problem. We define the worth of a coalition S as the cost of connecting agents in S to the source assuming that agents in N\S are already connected to the source, and agents in S can connect through agents in N\S. We study the Shapley value of this new game.

Keywords

Minimum cost spanning tree problems Optimistic TU game Shapley value 

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Copyright information

© Springer Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Research Group in Economic Analysis, Facultade de Ciencias EconómicasUniversidade de VigoVigoSpain
  2. 2.Research Group in Economic Analysis, Facultade de Ciencias SociaisUniversidade de VigoPontevedraSpain

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