International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 36, Issue 2, pp 209–222 | Cite as

The core and the Weber set for bicooperative games

  • J. M. Bilbao
  • J. R. Fernández
  • N. Jiménez
  • J. J. López
Original Paper

Abstract

This paper studies two classical solution concepts for the structure of bicooperative games. First, we define the core and the Weber set of a bicooperative game and prove that the core is always contained in the Weber set. Next, we introduce a special class of bicooperative games, the so-called bisupermodular games, and show that these games are the only ones in which the core and the Weber set coincide.

AMS Subject Classification

91A12 

Keywords

Bicooperative games Core Weber set Bisupermodular games 

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Copyright information

© Springer Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. M. Bilbao
    • 1
  • J. R. Fernández
    • 1
  • N. Jiménez
    • 1
  • J. J. López
    • 1
  1. 1.Escuela Superior de Ingenieros, Matemática Aplicada IIUniversidad de SevillaSevillaSpain

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