Communication and bargaining in the spatial model

  • Adam Meirowitz
Original Paper


This paper studies collective choice by participants possessing private information in policymaking institutions that involve cheap-talk communication and bargaining. The main result establishes a connection between the extent to which problems of this type posses fully-revealing equilibria that select policies in the full information majority rule core (when it is well-defined) and the extent to which a fictitious sender-receiver game possesses a fully revealing equilibria. This result allows us to extend Banks and Duggan’s (Am polit Sci Rev 94(1) 73–88, 2000) core equivalence results to the case of noisy policymaking environments with private information and communication when some combination of non exclusivity and preference alignment conditions are satisfied.


Private Information Ideal Point Bargaining Game Cheap Talk Collective Choice 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


  1. Austen-Smith D, Feddersen T (2003a) Deliberation and voting rules. Northwestern University TypescriptGoogle Scholar
  2. Austen-Smith D, Feddersen T (2003b) The inferiority of deliberation under unanimity rule. Northwestern University TypescriptGoogle Scholar
  3. Baliga S, Morris S (2002) Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk. J Econ Theory 105:450–468CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Banks J, Duggan J (2000) A bargaining model of collective choice. Am Polit Sci Rev 94(1):73–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Banks J, Duggan J (2004) A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games. Soc Choice Welfare (forthcoming)Google Scholar
  6. Baron DP (2000) Legislative Organization with Informational Committees. Am J Polit Sci 44(3):485–505CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Baron D, Ferejohn J (1989) Bargaining in Legislatures. Am Polit Sci Rev 83:1181–206CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Baron D, Kalai E (1993) The simplest equilibrium of a majority rule division game. J Econ Theory 61:290–301CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Baron DP, Meirowitz A (2006) Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models. Soc Choice Welfare 26:455–470CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Battaglini M (2002) Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk. Econometrica 70:1379–1401CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Battaglini M (2004) Policy advice with imperfectly informed agents. Adv Theoretical Econ 4(1)Google Scholar
  12. Bendor J, Meirowitz A (2004) Spatial Models of Delegation. Am Polit Sci Rev 98:293–310CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Coughlan PJ (2000) In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting. Am Polit Sci Rev 94:375–393CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Crawford VP, Sobel J (1982) Strategic Information Transmission. Econometrica 50(6):1431–1451CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Duggan J (1997) Virtual bayesian implementation. Econometrica 65(5):1175–1199CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Fishkin JS (1991) Democracy and deliberation: new directions for democratic reform. Yale University Press, New HavenGoogle Scholar
  17. Gerardi D, Yariv L (2003) Putting your ballot where your mouth is: an analysis of collective choice with communication. Yale University TypescriptGoogle Scholar
  18. Gilligan TW, Krehbiel K (1987) Collective decision-making and standing committees: an informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures. J Law Econ Organ 3(2):287–335Google Scholar
  19. Gilligan TW, Krehbiel K (1989) Asymmetric information and legislative rules with a heterogenous committee. Am J Polit Sci 33(2):459–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Gutmann A, Thompson D (1996) Democracy and Disagreement. Belknap, Harvard Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  21. Kim J (2005) Pe-play communication in games of two-sided incomplete information. University of Rochester TypescriptGoogle Scholar
  22. Krishna V, Morgan J (2001) Asymmetric information and legislative rules: some amendments. Am Polit Sci Rev 95(2):435–452CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Palfrey TR, Srivastava S (1987) On bayesian implementable allocations. Rev Econ Stud 54:193–208CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Plott C (1967) A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule. Am Econ Rev 57:787–806Google Scholar
  25. Postlewaite A, Schmeidler D (1986) Implementation in differential information economies. J Econ Theory 39:14–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Meirowitz A (2003) In defence of exclusionary deliberation: communication and voting with private beliefs and values. J Theor Polit (in press)Google Scholar
  27. Meirowitz A (2006) Designing institutions to aggregate preferences and information. Q J Polit Sci 1(4):373–392CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Myerson R (1979) Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica 47:61–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Myerson R (1982) Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems. J Math Econ 10:67–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PoliticsPrinceton UniversityPrincetonUSA

Personalised recommendations