International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 35, Issue 2, pp 287–314 | Cite as

Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule

Original Paper

Abstract

We analyze the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Specifically, we analyze the concepts of strong equilibrium and coalition-proof equilibrium for plurality rule and runoff rule elections. We characterize these equilibria in the three candidate case, and provide results for important special cases in the general multicandidate case.

Keywords

Strategic voting Runoff rule Plurality rule Coalition-proofness Communication 

JEL Classification

D72 

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Copyright information

© Springer Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.IGIERBocconi UniversityMilanItaly
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsUniversity of IllinoisChampaignUSA

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