Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
We analyze the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Specifically, we analyze the concepts of strong equilibrium and coalition-proof equilibrium for plurality rule and runoff rule elections. We characterize these equilibria in the three candidate case, and provide results for important special cases in the general multicandidate case.
KeywordsStrategic voting Runoff rule Plurality rule Coalition-proofness Communication
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