International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 35, Issue 2, pp 223–249 | Cite as

Endogenous platforms: the case of many parties

  • Andrei M. Gomberg
  • Francisco Marhuenda
  • Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín
Original Paper
  • 87 Downloads

Abstract

We analyze existence of equilibrium in a one-dimensional model of endogenous party platforms and more than two parties. The platforms proposed by parties depend on their membership composition. The policy implemented is a function of the different proposals and the vote distribution among such proposals. It is shown that if voters are sincere there is always an equilibrium regardless of the number of parties. In the case of strategic voting behavior, existence of equilibrium can be shown provided a subadditivity condition on the outcome function holds.

Keywords

Econ Theory Policy Outcome Vote Share Policy Space Strategic Vote 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrei M. Gomberg
    • 1
  • Francisco Marhuenda
    • 2
  • Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín
    • 3
  1. 1.Centro de Investigación EconómicaInstituto Tecnológico Autónomo de MéxicoMéxicoMéxico
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsUniversidad Carlos IIIMadridSpain
  3. 3.Department of Economics and IVIEUniversity of AlicanteAlicanteSpain

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