International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 35, Issue 3, pp 395–426 | Cite as

Dissection of solutions in cooperative game theory using representation techniques

  • L. Hernández-Lamoneda
  • R. Juárez
  • F. Sánchez-Sánchez
Original Paper


We compute a decomposition for the space of cooperative TU-games under the action of the symmetric group S n . In particular we identify all irreducible subspaces that are relevant to the study of symmetric linear solutions – namely those that are isomorphic to the irreducible summands of \(\mathbb{R}^n\). We then use such decomposition to derive, in a very economical way, some old and some new results for linear symmetric solutions.


Invariant Subspace Orthogonal Complement Symmetric Solution Representation Technique Cooperative Game Theory 
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Copyright information

© Springer Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • L. Hernández-Lamoneda
    • 1
  • R. Juárez
    • 2
  • F. Sánchez-Sánchez
    • 1
  1. 1.CIMATGuanajuatoMexico
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsRice UniversityHoustonUSA

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